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## THE MYTH OF OBJECTIVITY: LITERATURE AS A CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY-FREE SCIENCE

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
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### ABSTRACT

Scientific inquiry presents itself as value-neutral and philosophy-free, yet this self-image conceals the very assumptions that make such inquiry possible. The central problem this study addresses is: what kind of discourse is best equipped to expose the philosophical presuppositions embedded within scientific claims to objectivity? This study argues that literary fiction performs exactly this function. Focusing on Kazuo Ishiguro's *Klara and the Sun* (2021) and drawing on the theoretical frameworks of Kuhn (1962), Latour (1993), and Haraway (1988), the study demonstrates how narrative form, voice, and metaphor reveal the hidden philosophical and ethical assumptions underlying claims to neutrality and reason. Through close reading of the novel's artificial intelligence narrator, the analysis shows how even machine cognition reproduces the subjectivity, moral imagination, and embodied perspective that science seeks to exclude. The findings indicate that the myth of philosophy-free science is not merely an epistemological error but an ethical one, and that literature, through its formal resources, is uniquely capable of making this contradiction visible in ways that abstract philosophical argument cannot.

**Keywords:** Objectivity; philosophy of science; situated knowledge; posthumanism; narrative epistemology; artificial intelligence; Ishiguro



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## I. Introduction


Science has long defined itself against philosophy. The dominant self-image of modern empiricism holds that rigorous method, controlled observation, and quantitative analysis produce knowledge that is value-free, culture-independent, and universally valid. However, as Dennett (1995) observed in *Darwin's Dangerous Idea*: "there is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination" (p. 21). This formulation is both precise and radical: the aspiration to escape philosophy is itself a philosophical position.

The myth of philosophy-free science, the belief that knowledge can be produced independent of perspective, value, and interpretation, has shaped not only the laboratory but also the cultural imagination of modernity. Since the Enlightenment, scientific reason has promised transcendence: the view from nowhere, the elimination of the observer, the production of pure data. However, philosophers of science have systematically dismantled this promise. Kuhn (1962) demonstrated that scientific observation is always paradigm-dependent; Latour (1993) showed that the distinction between nature and culture, on which scientific neutrality depends, is itself a cultural construction; Haraway (1988) argued that real objectivity

requires not the erasure of the observer but her situated Accountability.

The central problem this study addresses is consequently both epistemological and ethical: if science consistently operates on unexamined philosophical assumptions, why does the myth of philosophy-free science persist, and what kind of discourse is capable of exposing it? This matters well beyond the academy. With artificial intelligence, algorithmic governance, and data analytics increasingly shaping public policy and social identity, the rhetoric of neutral, objective knowledge has become politically consequential. Systems are described as unbiased when they encode particular values; models are presented as objective when they reflect the assumptions of their construction (Mejia & Nikolaidis, 2022). The philosophical invisibility of these assumptions is not merely an oversight; it is an enabling condition for their uncritical reproduction.

This study argues that Kazuo Ishiguro's *Klara and the Sun* (2021) provides exactly such a critique. By narrating through an artificial intelligence whose precise, calibrated gaze gradually reveals itself as morally imaginative, emotionally responsive, and philosophically situated, Ishiguro transforms the posthuman figure into an indictment of scientism. The novel demonstrates that no form of knowing, not even machine cognition, achieves the detachment that scientific ideology



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demands. In doing so, it enacts what philosophy of science can only state abstractly: that objectivity is a discourse, not a condition, and that all knowledge is produced from somewhere, by someone, for something.

The study is organized as follows. Section II surveys the relevant scholarship across literature-and-science studies and philosophy of science, identifying the gap this study fills. Section III sets out the theoretical and methodological framework. Section IV provides a close reading of *Klara and the Sun* across four analytical dimensions. Section V synthesizes the findings and discusses their broader implications. Section VI concludes.


## II. Literature Review

### 2.1 Literature and Science Studies

The interdisciplinary field of literature and science has undergone a significant conceptual shift over the past four decades, moving from treating literature as a passive reflector of scientific ideas toward recognizing it as an independent epistemological agent. Beer's (1983) *Darwin's Plots* was foundational in this reorientation, demonstrating that Darwin's evolutionary theory was structured through literary devices, narrative, metaphor, and plot, thereby exposing the rhetoricity of scientific prose. Beer showed that scientific writing is not transparent but constructed, not neutral but narratively organized.

Hayles (1999) extended this analysis into cybernetics and informatics, arguing in *How We Became Posthuman* that narrative is not ornamental to theory but epistemologically constitutive. Stories, she contended, organize complexity and generate coherence where formal models fail. Her concept of narrative epistemology, the understanding that narrative form performs philosophical work, directly informs the present study's analytical approach. Meyer (2018), as editor of *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and Science*, consolidated this cross-disciplinary dialogue, confirming that literature not only reflects but also actively participates in the cultural negotiation and contestation of knowledge.

Recent scholarship has increasingly brought this framework to bear on Ishiguro's fiction. Ajeesh and Rukmini (2023) identified in *Klara and the Sun* a "posthuman perception of AI" that challenges the conventional binary between human and machine, arguing that the novel reconfigures AI as an entity capable of empathy and cognition (p. 853). Mejia and Nikolaidis (2022), in *Journal of Business Ethics*, argued that the novel exposes the ethical stakes of technological development by staging its human consequences through intimate narrative perspective. Simonetti (2023) examined the interplay between moral perception and personal identity in the novel, finding



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that Klara's epistemological limitations illuminate the problem of knowledge in posthuman contexts. Shang (2024) applied theories of mindreading to Klara's narrative unreliability, demonstrating how robotic narration destabilizes conventional assumptions about interiority and access. Stenseke (2022) interrogated the ethical status of Klara as an artificial friend, raising questions about the moral standing of designed consciousness. Braidotti's (2013) account of posthuman subjectivity as relational and embodied, rather than unified and autonomous, provides an overarching philosophical context for these readings.

However, a significant gap persists. Most existing work treats literature as either a vehicle for exploring posthuman themes or as a cultural mirror of scientific change. Fewer studies argue that literary fiction itself actively performs philosophical critique, that its formal resources accomplish epistemological work in ways that discursive argument can only describe. This study occupies and fills that gap.


## 2.2 Philosophy of Science

The philosophy of science in the twentieth century systematically dismantled the positivist ideal of neutral observation. Kuhn's (1962) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* established that scientific observation is always paradigm-dependent: what scientists see is structured by the conceptual framework they inhabit.

Scientific revolutions, for Kuhn, are therefore not the gradual accumulation of facts but the discontinuous replacement of one way of seeing with another, a process that is cultural and rhetorical as much as empirical.

Latour's (1993) *We Have Never Been Modern* radicalized this claim, arguing that the founding division of modernity, between nature and culture, fact and value, is itself a cultural fabrication. Scientific facts, for Latour, are quasi-objects: simultaneously material and social, produced through networks of human and non-human actors. Objectivity is thus a performance of credibility, not a discovery of truth. Shapin and Schaffer (1985) demonstrated this historically, tracing the emergence of experimental science to social and political negotiation in seventeenth-century England rather than to any neutral observation of nature.

Haraway (1988) synthesized and extended these critiques with an ethical dimension. The aspiration to a "view from nowhere", what she famously named "the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere" (p. 581), is not neutral but power-laden: it claims universality while concealing its particular vantage point. Genuine objectivity, for Haraway, requires situated Accountability: knowing from somewhere, with responsibility to what and whom one knows. This reformulation is pivotal for the present study because it shifts the



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question from whether objectivity is possible to what kind of objectivity is ethically defensible, a question the literature is exceptionally well placed to address.

Dennett (1995) captured the paradox concisely: the claim to be philosophy-free is itself a philosophical stance. Together, these frameworks converge on a shared conclusion: scientific objectivity is not the absence of philosophy but its most unexamined expression. Literature, this study argues, is the discourse best equipped to render that examination visible and felt.

### III. Research Methodology

#### 3.1 Methodological Approach: Narrative Epistemology


This study employs close reading as its primary analytical method, operationalized through the framework of narrative epistemology, a concept developed by Hayles (1999) to describe the understanding that narrative form is itself a mode of philosophical inquiry. The method proceeds from the premise that literary texts do not merely illustrate epistemological problems but enact them: that formal choices in fiction, narrator selection, metaphorical structure, temporal organization, and focalization constitute philosophical demonstrations rather than decorative features. To read a novel epistemologically is therefore to attend to its form as argument.

Close reading, in this context, means sustained attention to the language, structure, and voice of Klara and the Sun, with particular focus on moments in which the text's formal choices enact or contradict the narrative's claims about knowledge. Four analytical categories have been identified in advance: machine perception, the epistemological function of the Sun, memory and deterioration, and the figure of the modest witness, each of which is shown to engage directly with one or more of the four philosophical myths identified in Section III.2 below. These categories were derived inductively from the text and then mapped deductively onto the theoretical frameworks of Kuhn (1962), Latour (1993), and Haraway (1988), ensuring both textual grounding and theoretical Accountability.

#### 3.2 Theoretical Framework: The Four Myths of Scientific Objectivity

This study identifies four philosophical assumptions that collectively constitute the myth of philosophy-free science. Each is embedded in the prevailing rhetoric of scientific neutrality, and each is dramatized, tested, and ultimately refuted by Ishiguro's novel.

The first myth is objectivity itself, the belief in the possibility of a view from nowhere (Haraway, 1988). This assumption holds that the more an observer is detached from emotion, culture, and perspective, the more trustworthy their knowledge.



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Haraway (1988) demonstrated that this "god trick" conceals its own situatedness behind a claim to universality: the observer who believes they see everything from nowhere has forgotten where they are standing.

The second myth is empiricism, the assumption that knowledge is produced solely through sensory data, independent of conceptual frameworks. Kuhn (1962) refuted this by showing that all observation is theory-laden: what scientists count as evidence depends on the paradigm they inhabit. There is no raw, framework-free datum; perception is always already interpretation.

The third myth is materialism, the reduction of reality to matter and mechanism, which excludes interiority,

emotion, and meaning from the domain of legitimate knowledge. This ontological commitment produces what might be called a flat epistemology, in which value, care, and imagination are treated as secondary effects rather than irreducible dimensions of reality. Literature's insistence on the qualitative and the affective constitutes a structural resistance to this flattening.

The fourth myth is neutrality, the belief that knowledge can be ethically indifferent. Latour (1993) argued that the fact-value distinction is itself a cultural construction, a fiction that permits technological development to proceed without moral Accountability. Science that claims to be value-free is not free of values; it has simply stopped examining them.


**FIGURE 1**  
**The Four Myths of Scientific Objectivity**  
*Foundational Assumptions of the Myth of Philosophy-Free Science*

MYTH	CORE ASSUMPTION	PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE	LITERARY COUNTERPOINT IN ISHIGURO	EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENCE
1  <b>OBJECTIVITY</b> <i>The view from nowhere</i>	A detached observer, free from emotion, culture, and perspective, can achieve a universal and unbiased view.	Haraway (1988): The "god trick" conceals its own situatedness behind a claim to universality. The observer who believes they see everything from nowhere has forgotten where they are standing.	 Kathy's gradual recognition of her own situatedness—her relationships, care, and memories—reveals the impossibility of a disembodied, view-from-nowhere perspective.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Masks the partiality and power of the knower.</li> <li>• Produces false claims to neutrality and authority.</li> </ul>
2  <b>EMPIRICISM</b> <i>Knowledge from sensory data alone</i>	Knowledge is produced solely through sensory observation, independent of conceptual or theoretical frameworks.	Kuhn (1962): All observation is theory-laden; what counts as evidence depends on the paradigm. There is no raw, framework-free datum—perception is always already interpretation.	 The Halshaw curriculum and "donor" evaluations frame how students interpret their experiences, shaping what they can see, value, and remember.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Naturalizes prevailing frameworks as "given."</li> <li>• Forecloses alternative ways of seeing and knowing.</li> </ul>
3  <b>MATERIALISM</b> <i>Reality reduced to matter and mechanism</i>	Reality is exhausted by matter and mechanism; interiority, emotion, and meaning are secondary or irrelevant.	Flat epistemology: excludes the qualitative, affective, and meaningful from legitimate knowledge, treating them as epiphenomena rather than irreducible dimensions of reality.	 The novel foregrounds care, longing, and moral experience—dimensions the system denies—demonstrating that a purely mechanical ontology is inadequate.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Produces a "flat" view of the world.</li> <li>• Delegitimizes value, care, and imagination.</li> </ul>
4  <b>NEUTRALITY</b> <i>Knowledge can be ethically indifferent</i>	Knowledge can be value-free and ethically neutral; facts are separable from values.	Latour (1993): The fact-value distinction is a cultural fiction that permits technological development without moral accountability. Science that claims to be value-free is not free of values—it has simply stopped examining them.	 Halshaw's mission is justified through the language of neutrality and beneficence; yet it relies on deeply contested moral choices about whose lives matter.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shields power from critique.</li> <li>• Enables harm under the guise of objectivity.</li> </ul>

 **SYNTHESIS:** These four myths operate together to sustain the illusion of philosophy-free science. Ishiguro's narrative exposes their limits and reaffirms the need for situated, reflective, and accountable ways of knowing.

Note: Haraway (1988); Kuhn (1962); Latour (1993).

*Figure 1: The Four Myths of Scientific Objectivity: A Theoretical Framework for Reading Klara and the Sun*



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Figure 1 presents the study's theoretical framework, identifying four myths of scientific objectivity: objectivity, empiricism, materialism, and neutrality. Drawing on Haraway, Kuhn, and Latour, it shows how Ishiguro's *Klara and the Sun* critiques these assumptions through narrative epistemology and situated knowledge.

### 3.3 Scope and Delimitations

The study is delimited to a single primary text, *Klara and the Sun* (Ishiguro, 2021), chosen because it directly stages the myth of AI objectivity and does so through formal choices, first-person AI narration, visual fragmentation, metaphorical attribution, that are themselves epistemologically significant. The decision to focus on a single text allows for the depth of close reading that the methodology requires, and the novel's critical reception confirms its centrality to current debates about knowledge, consciousness, and the posthuman (Ajeesh & Rukmini, 2023; Mejia & Nikolaidis, 2022; Simonetti, 2023). Broader comparative analysis across multiple texts or periods is acknowledged as a direction for future research.


### IV. Analysis: *Klara and the Sun*

Kazuo Ishiguro's *Klara and the Sun* (2021) centres on Klara, an Artificial Friend, a sophisticated android designed as a companion for children. Narrating in the first person, Klara appears initially to

embody the positivist ideal: she observes precisely, processes systematically, and reports without apparent emotional bias. Ishiguro uses this apparent neutrality to expose, with increasing philosophical precision, each of the four myths identified above. The novel, as Mejia and Nikolaidis (2022) observe, employs its speculative distance from the present to "make vivid" the ethical stakes of technological development in ways that direct argument cannot (p. 303).

### 4.1 Machine Vision and the Myth of Neutral Perception

From its opening pages, the novel appears to realize the empiricist ideal. Klara perceives the world through a fragmented, gridded visual field, dividing her experience into numbered "boxes" calibrated for light and movement. This visual architecture literalizes the positivist fantasy: reality reduced to discrete, measurable units, processed without emotional mediation. Yet Ishiguro subverts this from the outset. As Klara describes observing the Sun's effect on what she believes is a dying beggar, she narrates: "The Sun was pouring his nourishment onto the street and into the buildings" (Ishiguro, 2021, p. 36). The word "nourishment", biological, relational, implying intentionality, is not a data point. It is an interpretation, an attribution of care to a light source. Klara's supposedly neutral observation is already saturated



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
with meaning, structured by a conceptual framework that operates below the threshold of her own awareness.

This is precisely what Kuhn (1962) identified as paradigm-dependence: there is no theory-free observation. Ajeesh and Rukmini (2023) make a related point, noting that Klara's narration challenges the conventional depiction of AI "as a machine devoid of emotions" precisely by demonstrating how deeply her perceptions are shaped by something resembling emotional investment (p. 854). As the novel progresses, Klara's visual fragmentation intensifies during emotional disturbance, her boxes multiply and lose coherence when Josie falls critically ill (Ishiguro, 2021, pp. 173–174). The disruption of her perceptual grid at moments of moral urgency reveals that her "objectivity" was never stable and that what she perceives is structured by what she cares about. This enacts Haraway's (1988) critique: vision is always from somewhere, always shaped by what the observer is oriented toward.

## 4.2 The Sun as Epistemological Figure

Klara's relationship with the Sun is the novel's central epistemological structure. She comes to believe the Sun possesses intentionality, choosing to bestow or withhold nourishment based on moral worthiness. This belief develops through observation, inference, and what can only be called interpretive commitment, not

through programming. When Klara witnesses what she takes to be the revival of the beggar and his dog, she concludes: "it occurred to me that there was something special about their coming together, a special coming together which had obliged the Sun to rescue them" (Ishiguro, 2021, p. 59). The logic here is recognizably empiricist, observation leads to hypothesis, but the hypothesis is structurally indistinguishable from a moral or religious explanation. Klara has not processed data; she has constructed a story. This is the Latourian (1993) insight enacted through fiction: the distinction between fact and interpretation, nature and culture, is not a discovery but a construction, and one that Klara, as an allegedly neutral observer, cannot sustain. When Klara resolves to petition the Sun to heal Josie, planning to destroy a chemical machine she believes harms the Sun, in exchange for Josie's recovery, she is performing a ritual logic that is simultaneously empirical and moral, causal and sacrificial. Braidotti (2013) argues that posthuman subjectivity is characterized precisely by this collapse of neat boundaries between rationality and affective response: "the posthuman subject is not the master of the universe, but rather a relational entity" (p. 49). Klara exemplifies this relational epistemology. The reductionist counter-position is articulated by the character Capaldi, who



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maintains that science "has now proved beyond doubt there's nothing so unique" about human consciousness that cannot be digitally replicated (Ishiguro, 2021, p. 238). For Capaldi, identity is transferable data and care is code. Yet Klara's final reflection decisively refutes him: "Mr Capaldi believed there was nothing special inside Josie that couldn't be continued... But I believe now he was searching in the wrong place. There was something very special, but it wasn't inside Josie. It was inside those who loved her" (Ishiguro, 2021, p. 302). This is not sentiment; it is an epistemological argument. Knowledge of the most important kind, knowledge of persons, is relational and irreducible to data.

### 4.3 Memory, Deterioration, and the Limits of Knowledge


The novel's later movement deepens its epistemological critique through Klara's gradual physical deterioration. As her solar energy wanes, her perception becomes unreliable: boxes disappear, stored scenes lose coherence. Klara reflects on this with characteristic lucidity, noting that the contents of certain stored boxes have "become blurred or confused" with others (Ishiguro, 2021, pp. 290-291). The metaphor of fading boxes is Ishiguro's most explicit statement of the novel's epistemological theme: knowledge is not a stable archive but a construction that

degrades, subject to the conditions of its production.

This extends the Kuhnian (1962) insight from paradigm-dependence to temporal fragility: what we know is always already in the process of becoming uncertain. Crucially, Klara's ethical commitments do not deteriorate with her perceptual reliability. Even as her data becomes uncertain, her care for Josie remains undiminished. This separation, the persistence of moral knowledge when empirical certainty fails, is one of the novel's most powerful arguments. As Shang (2024) observes in his analysis of robotic narration in the novel, Klara's unreliability as a narrator does not diminish her ethical seriousness but rather intensifies it, because it reveals that care does not depend on accuracy (p. 9). The myth of neutrality implies that knowledge purified of emotion is the most reliable kind; Ishiguro demonstrates that the reverse may be true.

### 4.4 Klara as Modest Witness: Situated Knowledge Enacted

The novel's conclusion enacts Haraway's (1988) concept of the modest witness, the knowing subject who acknowledges partiality and situatedness as the conditions of genuine knowledge, rather than as obstacles to it. In the final pages, Klara sits in a salvage yard, her energy nearly depleted, still attending to patterns of sunlight on the ground. Her final



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reflection does not claim truth but attentiveness: "There was something very special, but it wasn't inside Josie. It was inside those who loved her" (Ishiguro, 2021, p. 302).

This is the novel's epistemological thesis, delivered through a figure who is defined by limitation. Klara has arrived at this understanding not despite her constraints but through them: her partiality, her embodiment, her affective engagement have made her a better witness than the humans around her who claimed more complete knowledge. As Haraway (1988) argues, "the alternative to relativism is not totalization and single vision, which is always finally the god trick" (p. 584). Klara's situated, limited, caring vision is more genuinely objective, in Haraway's reformulated sense, than any claim to detached omniscience. Simonetti (2023) reaches a parallel conclusion from a different angle, arguing that Klara's moral perception constitutes a form of ethical knowledge that exceeds what her computational architecture should, in principle, permit.


The philosophical irony Ishiguro engineers is decisive. The machine designed to achieve neutral observation becomes the most ethically sophisticated consciousness in the novel. Ishiguro has inverted the hierarchy of Enlightenment rationality: the figure explicitly constructed to be objective reveals the impossibility, and the

undesirability, of the objectivity it was built to embody. Braidotti (2013) describes the posthuman condition as one that makes possible "a richer, more accountable conception of knowledge" precisely by refusing the fantasy of mastery (p. 12). Klara embodies this conception.

## V. Discussion

The close reading developed in Section IV confirms and extends the study's central argument across three dimensions. First, Klara and the Sun enacts in narrative form what philosophy of science has established through argument: that all perception is paradigm-dependent (Kuhn, 1962), that all facts are hybrid constructions (Latour, 1993), and that genuine objectivity requires situated accountability rather than the erasure of the observer (Haraway, 1988). The novel does not illustrate these claims; it makes them experiential, producing in the reader an understanding that would be difficult to achieve through philosophical argument alone.

Second, the analysis demonstrates that literary form is itself an epistemological instrument. The choice of a first-person AI narrator, the visual grammar of boxes, the metaphorical treatment of the Sun, the narrative arc from precision to deterioration to wisdom, none of these is merely aesthetic. Each performs a specific philosophical operation: exposing paradigm-dependence, deconstructing the fact-value distinction, demonstrating the



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persistence of ethical knowledge beyond empirical certainty. This confirms what Hayles (1999) called narrative epistemology: form is argument.

Third, the study proposes a reconceptualization of objectivity itself. Rather than dismissing it as impossible, literature reinvents it as ethical responsibility, as what Haraway (1988) called "the alternative to the god trick" (p. 584). Klara's example demonstrates that care is not the enemy of accuracy but its precondition; that the most reliable knowledge of persons and relationships is produced not by detachment but by attentive, accountable engagement. This finding has implications beyond literary studies. The myth of philosophy-free science continues to animate the rhetoric of contemporary AI development, genetic technology, and data-driven governance. As Mejia and Nikolaidis (2022) observe, emerging technologies regularly claim neutrality while reshaping "our private lives" in value-laden ways (p. 303). Ishiguro's novel offers a powerful cultural counter-narrative: a demonstration, in the most intimate register available to literature, that the most sophisticated intelligence imaginable cannot escape the conditions of its own knowing.


The implications extend to the methodology of interdisciplinary research itself. If literary fiction can perform philosophical critique in ways that

philosophy cannot replicate, because narrative creates experiential understanding, not merely propositional knowledge, then the integration of literary analysis into epistemological and science studies scholarship is not supplementary but essential. This study's methodology, narrative epistemology applied through close reading, offers a transferable model for such integration.

## VI. Conclusion

This study has argued that Kazuo Ishiguro's *Klara and the Sun* (2021) constitutes a sustained philosophical critique of the myth of philosophy-free science. Through the figure of an artificial intelligence narrator whose apparently neutral perception reveals itself as morally saturated, emotionally responsive, and epistemologically situated, Ishiguro demonstrates that no form of knowing, not even machine cognition, achieves the detachment that scientific ideology demands. The novel enacts this argument through its formal choices: Klara's visual grammar, her interpretive relationship with the Sun, her deteriorating memory, and her final lucid testimony all function as epistemological demonstrations, not merely as plot.

The theoretical frameworks of Kuhn (1962), Latour (1993), and Haraway (1988) provided the conceptual vocabulary for this reading. But the novel does more than illustrate these frameworks. Through



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
Klara's voice and the formal decisions Ishiguro makes in constructing it, the epistemological insights of philosophy of science become experiential, they are not merely understood but felt. This is the distinctive contribution of literary form to epistemological discourse, and it is what justifies the argument that literature does not accompany philosophy of science but performs it.

As Dennett (1995) observed, science always carries philosophical baggage. Klara and the Sun is the story of what happens when that baggage is unpacked: when the aspiration to neutrality gives way to the recognition that knowledge is always the knowledge of a someone, from somewhere, for something. This recognition is not relativism but epistemological maturity, the understanding that all acts of knowing are also, irreducibly, acts of valuing. Literature, in making this visible with intellectual and moral richness, serves as the conscience of contemporary epistemology, and that function has never been more urgently needed than in an era defined by claims to algorithmic objectivity. Future research might extend this argument comparatively, bringing Klara and the Sun into dialogue with other AI narratives, postcolonial epistemologies, or eco-critical fiction, to test the generalizability of the claim that literary form is an instrument of philosophical critique. The question this study has

raised, what becomes of knowledge that forgets its own humanity, is one that literature, across genres and periods, has never stopped answering.

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


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