



CHINA’S GLOBAL SECURITY INITIATIVE (GSI) AND BELT AND ROAD (BRI):
SHAPING NEW PEACE AND SECURITY NORMS IN AFRICA

¹Dr. Assad Mehmood Khan

¹Associate Professor (HoD), Department of IR/Urdu, Minhaj University, Lahore
assadphdir@gmail.com

Abstract

China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are redefining the frameworks of peace and security engagement in Africa. This study aims to critically examine how these Chinese initiatives are shaping new norms within African security landscapes, departing from traditional Western-centric models. A qualitative research methodology is employed, utilizing document analysis of policy papers, speeches, and multilateral agreements, supplemented by expert interviews from African diplomatic and security communities. Thematic analysis is used as the primary data analysis technique to identify emerging patterns and narratives. Findings reveal that China's GSI promotes a model of security emphasizing state sovereignty, political non-interference, and economic development as pillars of stability, while the BRI embeds security concerns into infrastructure and investment projects across the continent. The research recommends that African states critically assess the long-term impacts of aligning with Chinese security frameworks, ensuring these align with their own governance priorities and human security needs. Future implications suggest that the evolution of Sino-African security relations could redefine global peacebuilding norms, creating alternative models to Western liberal peace agendas. The study concludes that while China's approach offers new opportunities, it also presents challenges that require strategic navigation by African policymakers.

Key Words: China, Global Security Initiative (GSI), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Africa, Peacebuilding, Security Norms

Article Details:

Received on 04 April 2025
Accepted on 29 April 2025
Published on 03 May 2025

Corresponding Authors*:

INTRODUCTION

China's increasing engagement in Africa through initiatives like the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a significant shift in global peace and security discourses. Traditionally, Africa's security partnerships were predominantly shaped by Western powers, emphasizing liberal democratic values and human rights conditions. However, China's model, grounded in mutual benefit, state sovereignty, and non-interference, proposes an alternative framework for African nations seeking greater agency in their international relations (Alden, 2007, p. 32). The GSI, launched by President Xi Jinping in 2022, positions security as an inseparable partner to development, promoting dialogue over coercion and placing regional needs at the center of intervention strategies (Xinhua, 2022, p. 5). Simultaneously, the BRI's vast infrastructure investments intertwine economic development with security guarantees, highlighting China's view that stability emerges from prosperity (Callahan, 2016, p. 77). Thus, Africa emerges as a critical testing ground for China's evolving peace and security paradigms.

At the core of China's security engagements lies a fundamental philosophical difference from the Western liberal peacebuilding model. Whereas Western actors often prioritize democratic reforms and human rights benchmarks, China's GSI underscores political sovereignty and cultural relativism, emphasizing that no one-size-fits-all solution exists for peace (Tiezzi, 2022, p. 12). The Belt and Road Initiative extends this approach by embedding security provisions directly into development projects, such as safeguarding transportation corridors and energy supply chains (Rolland, 2017, p. 143). In the African context, where post-colonial states frequently grapple with externally imposed norms, China's model resonates with long-standing demands for respect for national ownership of security agendas. This departure from prescriptive international interventions suggests that China's influence could gradually reshape Africa's understanding of peace, not as a democratic outcome, but as a condition anchored in economic success and political stability.

This research aims to investigate how China's GSI and BRI initiatives contribute to shaping new peace and security norms across Africa, analyzing both opportunities and potential risks. Special attention is paid to the mechanisms through which China promotes these new norms—diplomatic engagements, security dialogues, military training programs, and developmental aid packages embedded with security elements (Sun, 2015, p. 24). Understanding China's strategies requires examining African agency as well; African nations are not passive recipients but active negotiators in these partnerships. This nuanced analysis challenges the simplistic narrative of Chinese neo-colonialism and explores whether African states are merely accommodating Chinese interests or using the partnership to craft hybrid security strategies that better reflect their domestic needs (Mlambo, 2021, p. 91).

The methodology employed in this study is qualitative, centered on document analysis and semi-structured interviews. Primary sources include Chinese government white papers, African Union strategic documents, and bilateral agreements between China and African states. Secondary sources consist of scholarly articles, policy briefs, and expert analyses that offer interpretations of China's African engagements. Semi-structured interviews with African security experts, diplomats, and academics provide additional empirical depth, capturing perceptions that are not always visible in official documents (Kuo, 2022, p. 58). Thematic coding and narrative analysis guide the interpretation of the

collected data, ensuring that emergent themes concerning sovereignty, development, and security integration are rigorously traced throughout China's GSI and BRI activities.

The data analysis technique primarily used is thematic analysis, allowing for a flexible but systematic identification of patterns within qualitative data. Coding categories were developed inductively, capturing recurring themes such as "non-interference," "infrastructure security," and "alternative peace frameworks" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Particular attention was paid to variations across different African sub-regions, acknowledging that China's impact is not monolithic across the continent. North African countries, for example, emphasize different security concerns compared to their sub-Saharan counterparts. Such differentiation allows for a more precise understanding of how China's GSI and BRI initiatives adapt—or fail to adapt—to varying local contexts, and how these interactions collectively shape emerging African peace and security norms.

Findings indicate that China's GSI and BRI are actively influencing African security norms by normalizing the principle that development-led security is as legitimate as democracy-led security. In East Africa, for instance, China's engagement in port construction and security training has facilitated economic revitalization efforts while simultaneously reshaping local governance structures (Kuo, 2022, p. 73). In West Africa, China's partnerships in counterterrorism and cybersecurity suggest a growing acceptance of a state-centered approach to peace, contrasting sharply with Western models that prioritize community-based peacebuilding (Sun, 2015, p. 42). While these models offer alternative pathways for stability, concerns persist about the potential for reinforcing authoritarian tendencies under the guise of sovereignty and development, especially in fragile states.

Based on the findings, this study recommends that African governments strategically balance engagement with China by emphasizing transparency, community participation, and regional cooperation frameworks. While China's GSI and BRI offer tangible benefits—such as infrastructure funding and diplomatic support—African states must avoid dependency dynamics that could undermine domestic accountability structures (Alden, 2007, p. 45). Proactive negotiation of partnership terms, joint standard-setting on security practices, and multilateral oversight mechanisms will be critical in ensuring that African interests remain protected. Furthermore, incorporating civil society perspectives into discussions about development-security linkages can mitigate risks of elite capture and promote more inclusive peacebuilding processes.

Looking ahead, China's evolving security engagements in Africa are likely to have significant ramifications for global peace and security architectures. As African states increasingly look eastward for models of development and stability, traditional Western donors may need to reassess their strategies to remain influential partners (Callahan, 2016, p. 112). Furthermore, China's model could inspire new hybrid approaches to peacebuilding that combine elements of state-led development with locally-driven governance reforms. Whether these shifts result in more stable, prosperous societies across Africa will depend largely on how well African actors manage to harness the opportunities presented by China's initiatives while safeguarding their political autonomy and social diversity.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The transformation of Africa's security architecture through external partnerships has long been a subject of scholarly interest. Historically, scholars like Clapham (1996, p. 22) have emphasized the dependency relationship between African states and Western powers, arguing that external influence often shaped internal security agendas in ways that

prioritized donor interests. In contrast, China's Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) mark a different mode of engagement, focusing on economic development as the pathway to stability. Scholars such as Brautigam (2009, p. 114) suggest that Chinese involvement in Africa offers an alternative development model that prioritizes infrastructure and state-building without imposing political preconditions, reflecting an emerging divergence from Western liberal interventionism.

The link between development and security in Chinese foreign policy is not new. Research by Taylor (2006, p. 77) on China-Africa relations underlines the idea that Beijing has consistently promoted economic growth as the foundation for peace, viewing political reform as a secondary or domestic concern. The BRI's expansion into Africa integrates this philosophy into massive projects such as railroads, ports, and energy plants, which in turn necessitate localized security arrangements. According to Lechini (2005, p. 52), African nations increasingly see in China a partner willing to invest in "hard infrastructure" while respecting national sovereignty, a significant shift from Western governance-centered aid.

The Belt and Road Initiative has been framed as a global connectivity project, but its security dimensions are becoming increasingly visible. As noted by Sidaway and Woon (2017, p. 330), the BRI requires stable environments to ensure the safety of Chinese assets and personnel abroad, thereby pushing China to develop new security mechanisms beyond its borders. In Africa, this has translated into a growing Chinese role in peacekeeping operations, anti-piracy missions, and bilateral security agreements. Scholars such as Alden and Wu (2014, p. 75) emphasize that China's presence in United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, especially in South Sudan and Mali, reflects a pragmatic shift towards a more active security posture, albeit still framed within the language of multilateralism and respect for sovereignty.

In examining the Global Security Initiative, some scholars argue that it represents a formalization of China's evolving international security philosophy. Feng and Huang (2022, p. 27) describe the GSI as a strategic attempt to project Chinese security values globally, emphasizing dialogue, mediation, and common security rather than alliance-based deterrence structures dominant in Western models. In the African context, the GSI promotes solutions that are "African-owned and African-led," echoing the African Union's Agenda 2063 objectives while simultaneously embedding Chinese perspectives on governance and stability. Scholars such as Large (2008, p. 101) suggest that such synergies are not purely altruistic but reflect a convergence of African needs and Chinese strategic interests.

The literature also highlights the role of private Chinese security companies in Africa as an extension of China's evolving security footprint. Research by Abdenur and Souza Neto (2014, p. 9) shows how Chinese companies now operate security services alongside major BRI projects, particularly in politically unstable regions. These private actors, while officially independent, often operate in alignment with broader Chinese foreign policy goals. This phenomenon raises important questions about the privatization of security and the blurring of lines between state and corporate interests in international peace and security practices.

A key concern in the literature revolves around the potential normative impact of China's model on African political systems. Scholars like Carmody and Hampwaye (2010, p. 82) warn that while Chinese engagement provides immediate economic and infrastructural benefits, it may also entrench authoritarian governance models by providing resources and legitimacy to regimes with questionable human rights records. In countries like Zimbabwe

and Sudan, China's investments have been criticized for reinforcing power structures resistant to political reform (Besada, Wang & Whalley, 2008, p. 457). This critique underscores the tension between development-led security and rights-based peacebuilding that increasingly characterizes Sino-African relations.

Nevertheless, some African scholars adopt a more nuanced view. Adesina (2020, p. 137) argues that African states are not merely passive recipients of Chinese influence but actively negotiate the terms of engagement to suit their strategic interests. For instance, Ethiopia's partnership with China has enabled massive infrastructure growth without Western-style policy conditionalities, thus providing the government with greater policy space to implement indigenous development models. Such dynamics suggest that Africa's engagement with China under the GSI and BRI frameworks could foster more pluralistic approaches to peace and security, albeit with varied outcomes depending on domestic governance structures.

Another emerging theme in the literature is the environmental and social impact of BRI projects in Africa. Research by Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power (2010, p. 868) notes that while Chinese-funded projects have catalyzed economic growth in some regions, they have also sparked local conflicts over land use, labor practices, and environmental degradation. These conflicts introduce new security challenges, sometimes requiring Chinese or local authorities to intervene, thus complicating China's principle of non-interference. The intersection of environmental, social, and political risks highlights the need for a broader conceptualization of security within the GSI framework, beyond traditional state-centric approaches.

Finally, a body of critical literature interrogates the long-term sustainability of Chinese-led security and development models. Mawdsley (2008, p. 513) contends that while China offers important alternatives to Western paradigms, it is not immune to the same pitfalls of dependency, inequality, and governance challenges. Moreover, the replication of the Chinese model may not be uniformly suitable across diverse African contexts, given the continent's varied political, social, and historical realities. These critiques suggest that while China's GSI and BRI provide fresh opportunities for rethinking peace and security in Africa, they also necessitate careful, context-sensitive adaptation to ensure positive and inclusive outcomes.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study adopts a qualitative research methodology to explore how China's Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are shaping new peace and security norms across Africa. Data collection involves an extensive review of primary sources such as Chinese government white papers, African Union strategic documents, memorandums of understanding, and official speeches by African and Chinese leaders. Additionally, secondary sources including peer-reviewed journal articles, policy briefs, and reports from international think tanks provide contextual analysis and diverse scholarly perspectives. Semi-structured interviews with African diplomats, security experts, and regional policy analysts supplement document analysis, offering firsthand insights into how African actors perceive and interact with China's security frameworks. Data is analyzed using thematic analysis, following Braun and Clarke's (2006, p. 88) flexible yet rigorous approach to identify patterns related to sovereignty, development-security linkages, and alternative peace models. An inductive coding strategy is employed, allowing key themes to emerge organically from the data without being constrained by pre-existing theoretical frameworks. Ethical considerations, including informed consent and data

confidentiality, are strictly observed throughout the research process to ensure reliability and credibility of findings.

FINDINGS

The findings of this study reveal that China's Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are reshaping Africa's peace and security norms through a development-centered and sovereignty-respecting model. Analysis of interviews and documents highlights that many African leaders perceive China's initiatives as offering an alternative to Western conditionality by prioritizing infrastructure investment and non-interference in domestic governance. The thematic analysis shows three dominant patterns: first, the securitization of Chinese-led infrastructure projects in fragile states like Ethiopia and Djibouti has introduced new bilateral and multilateral security arrangements; second, the emphasis on economic development as a pathway to peace has gained significant acceptance among African policymakers seeking stability without external political pressures; third, there is a visible diffusion of Chinese governance principles, such as state-centric stability, into African regional security strategies. However, the findings also identify emerging tensions, including concerns over debt dependency, environmental impacts, and limited community participation in some BRI projects. Despite these challenges, the overall sentiment among African elites appears favorable toward China's evolving security engagement, suggesting a gradual but clear normative shift in the continent's approach to peacebuilding and regional stability.

CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS IN AFRICA

China's integration of development and security through the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a major departure from traditional Western peacebuilding strategies. Instead of focusing primarily on democratization or human rights, China emphasizes infrastructure growth, economic empowerment, and state sovereignty as foundations for lasting peace. This method resonates strongly with many African governments, particularly those seeking fast-tracked development without political interference. As infrastructure projects like railways, ports, and highways materialize, African leaders increasingly tie security outcomes to economic prosperity. The Chinese model challenges previous assumptions that peace must precede development, suggesting instead that economic advancement itself generates security and stability. African nations facing post-conflict reconstruction have found appeal in this approach, especially where traditional peacebuilding efforts have failed. Therefore, the BRI-GSI linkage in Africa is shifting the paradigm from governance-centered interventions to material development strategies that promote state authority and economic integration.

A critical observation of China's strategy reveals a significant impact on national sovereignty narratives across Africa. Chinese projects frequently reinforce the idea that external actors should respect local political systems without imposing reforms. This principle has deeply resonated in post-colonial African states, which have historically resisted external political interventions. Through the BRI and GSI, China empowers African states to craft their own peace and security frameworks while providing technical and financial support to strengthen state institutions. Unlike Western models, which often come with conditionalities attached to aid or investment, the Chinese approach focuses on practical cooperation, mutual benefit, and non-interference. Consequently, African leaders increasingly adopt China's sovereignty-focused rhetoric when engaging in international forums. This shift is not merely rhetorical but translates into practical diplomatic and security alignments that reinforce regional stability through strong state structures. African



countries thereby navigate international partnerships with greater autonomy, leveraging Chinese support to reinforce domestic authority and legitimacy.

TABLE 1: KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINESE AND WESTERN PEACEBUILDING MODELS

Aspect	Chinese Model (GSI-BRI)	Western Model
Focus	Development-led security	Governance and democratization
Conditionalities	Minimal	Extensive (human rights, reforms)
Sovereignty Approach	Non-interference	Conditional sovereignty
Primary Tools	Infrastructure, Economic Aid	Political Reforms, Elections
Security Partnerships	Bilateral, Flexible	Formal Alliances, Structured

Chinese security engagement under the BRI-GSI framework also brings innovative models of cooperative security to the African continent. Rather than forming military alliances, China promotes bilateral and multilateral security dialogues centered on mutual interests, such as the protection of critical infrastructure and counterterrorism. African governments participating in such initiatives experience greater flexibility compared to traditional security partnerships dominated by Western powers. This evolving security framework is adaptive, responding to the specific risks associated with large-scale development projects like ports, energy facilities, and industrial zones. Furthermore, China’s promotion of "common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable" security concepts provides a more holistic approach to African stability. It incorporates economic, societal, and political dimensions of security, rather than focusing narrowly on military threats. As a result, African states are increasingly receptive to Chinese engagement models that offer a wide scope for regional customization while promoting peaceful development and regional integration.

An essential dimension of China’s strategy involves the strategic deployment of private security companies (PSCs) to safeguard its investments abroad. In Africa, PSCs have been instrumental in protecting BRI projects in regions where local security forces are inadequate. This phenomenon reflects the necessity of a flexible, scalable security model that operates within the host nation’s legal framework but remains responsive to project-specific risks. African states view this collaboration positively as it augments national security capacities without the political baggage often associated with foreign military bases. Furthermore, PSCs contribute to local employment and skills transfer, although concerns about accountability and jurisdiction occasionally arise. This localized security model underscores China’s broader philosophy of supporting African agency in managing peace and security challenges. It aligns with the GSI’s emphasis on context-sensitive solutions tailored to the unique historical and political realities of each African state, further enhancing China’s image as a cooperative development partner.

One limitation of China’s development-security model is the uneven distribution of benefits across different African societies. While national elites and urban centers frequently benefit from infrastructure-led growth, rural and marginalized communities often experience limited improvements. In some cases, the prioritization of large-scale projects has generated new local conflicts over land, resource allocation, and environmental degradation. Such unintended consequences challenge the assumption that infrastructure investment alone can universally generate stability. Moreover, the

centralized decision-making associated with many BRI projects occasionally overlooks local needs, fostering resentment among affected populations. Addressing these disparities will be crucial for the long-term sustainability of China's influence in Africa. Inclusive development policies and community engagement mechanisms need to be strengthened to ensure that the benefits of BRI-GSI initiatives reach a broader base of the population. Without addressing these challenges, the risk remains that localized grievances could escalate into larger security threats, undermining the broader objectives of China's Africa policy.

AFRICA'S STRATEGIC ADAPTATION TO CHINA'S SECURITY NORMS

African states have demonstrated considerable agency in adapting Chinese security initiatives to their local contexts. Rather than passively accepting Chinese models, many African governments selectively incorporate elements that fit their strategic priorities. For example, states with strong centralized authority, such as Rwanda and Ethiopia, have aligned more closely with China's state-centric security philosophy. Meanwhile, nations with vibrant civil societies and decentralized governance structures have sought to balance Chinese engagement with internal participatory processes. This hybrid adaptation reflects Africa's dynamic political landscape and the continent's increasing confidence in managing external partnerships. China's flexibility, offering development without political interference, provides African states the latitude to mix and match strategies in line with national interests. This selective adaptation ensures that China's influence remains valuable but not overpowering. Thus, African agency is preserved, enabling domestic actors to shape the evolving security norms while extracting maximum benefit from China's economic and political investment.

The rise of China as a critical actor in African peace and security has also influenced intra-African cooperation. China's emphasis on regional ownership aligns with existing African Union (AU) frameworks, such as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which advocate for African-led solutions to conflicts. By supporting AU missions logistically and financially without dictating political terms, China reinforces continental integration processes that have struggled under donor-driven frameworks. Moreover, African regional economic communities (RECs) have incorporated Chinese principles of mutual respect and sovereignty into their peace and security operations. This regionalization of security, facilitated by Chinese engagement, enhances Africa's collective capacity to respond to conflicts without overreliance on external powers. Consequently, the diffusion of Chinese peace and security norms through African institutions not only strengthens state sovereignty but also bolsters regional solidarity and resilience against external political manipulation.

A significant aspect of Africa's strategic response is the recalibration of diplomatic alignments in global forums. African states increasingly use Chinese support as leverage in negotiations with traditional Western partners. By demonstrating that alternatives to Western funding and security models exist, African leaders have expanded their negotiating space, demanding more equitable terms in trade, development, and security cooperation. This diplomatic diversification has shifted global power balances, compelling Western actors to reconsider paternalistic approaches toward Africa. China's presence effectively amplifies African voices in multilateral organizations like the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and International Monetary Fund. The African bloc's enhanced bargaining power reflects a broader transformation in global governance, wherein emerging partnerships foster greater multipolarity. Thus, Africa's engagement with China

under the BRI and GSI frameworks transcends material gains, contributing to the continent's political empowerment on the global stage.

Despite the advantages of the Chinese partnership, African nations are also aware of the potential pitfalls associated with overdependence. Some governments have initiated strategies to diversify foreign relations, balancing Chinese engagement with other rising powers such as India, Turkey, and Brazil. This strategic balancing ensures that African countries maintain a level of autonomy and avoid vulnerabilities stemming from excessive reliance on a single external actor. Policymakers increasingly emphasize the need for transparent negotiations, debt sustainability assessments, and local content requirements when engaging with Chinese projects. These practices reflect a growing sophistication among African negotiators, who seek to maximize benefits while mitigating risks. This pragmatic approach underscores that Africa's embrace of China is not blind but carefully calibrated, ensuring that national development and security goals are achieved without compromising sovereignty or long-term financial health.

CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS OF SINO-AFRICAN SECURITY COOPERATION

While the GSI and BRI initiatives have redefined Africa's peace and security landscape, several challenges threaten the sustainability of this partnership. One major concern is the growing issue of debt distress in some African countries heavily reliant on Chinese financing. Although Chinese loans often come with flexible terms, the sheer volume of borrowing for infrastructure and security projects has raised questions about long-term repayment capacities. Some BRI projects have not yet generated sufficient revenue to service debts, particularly in volatile regions where security risks disrupt operations. Addressing debt vulnerabilities will require innovative financing models, including public-private partnerships and revenue-sharing arrangements. Additionally, increased transparency in loan agreements could build greater public trust in Sino-African partnerships. Managing these financial risks is crucial to maintaining the credibility of China's development-security model in Africa and ensuring that future cooperation remains mutually beneficial.

Another challenge lies in the evolving geopolitical environment, where competition between major powers increasingly shapes African strategic choices. The intensifying rivalry between China and the West, particularly the United States and the European Union, places African states in a delicate position. While African nations have benefited from China's development-focused engagement, they must also navigate pressures from Western actors who view China's growing influence with suspicion. This geopolitical balancing act demands astute diplomacy and strategic foresight from African leaders. Ensuring that partnerships remain focused on African priorities rather than external competition will be essential. Maintaining a non-aligned stance could allow African states to extract maximum benefits from multiple partners while safeguarding their autonomy. However, missteps could expose countries to new forms of dependency or political polarization, undermining the very sovereignty and stability that Sino-African cooperation seeks to promote.

Security-related risks associated with BRI projects also present ongoing challenges. Infrastructure projects often intersect with fragile political environments, where grievances over land, employment, and environmental impacts can escalate into localized conflicts. Protecting Chinese investments and personnel without exacerbating tensions requires sophisticated conflict-sensitive strategies. African governments must prioritize inclusive

development planning that engages affected communities early in project cycles. Strengthening legal frameworks to govern land use, labor rights, and environmental standards will be critical. Additionally, China must ensure that its corporate actors adhere to best practices in corporate social responsibility. Failure to address these local dynamics could fuel resentment against both Chinese investors and African governments, undermining the broader goals of peace, development, and stability that underpin the GSI and BRI in Africa.

Despite these challenges, the future of Sino-African security cooperation appears promising. Opportunities for deepening collaboration exist in areas such as cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and climate security, where African states seek new partnerships beyond traditional security paradigms. Chinese technology companies are already expanding digital infrastructure across the continent, offering new possibilities for digital security frameworks. Meanwhile, China's growing emphasis on "green BRI" projects aligns with Africa's increasing prioritization of environmental security. Collaborative initiatives in these emerging sectors could further cement Sino-African relations. Additionally, greater African participation in the conceptualization and governance of security initiatives will enhance ownership and sustainability. As African agency grows, Sino-African cooperation could evolve into a more reciprocal partnership that reshapes global peace and security norms.

CONCLUSION

The study demonstrates that China's Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are significantly reshaping peace and security norms in Africa, offering an alternative development-security model that prioritizes state sovereignty, infrastructure development, and economic growth. The findings reveal a growing convergence between China's approach and African priorities, with many African governments adopting Chinese strategies to boost economic stability and national security. However, while the partnership offers numerous benefits, it also presents challenges, particularly concerning debt sustainability, local conflicts arising from infrastructure projects, and the need for inclusive development. Despite these issues, the prospects for Sino-African security cooperation remain promising, as African states continue to strategically adapt to China's influence, while balancing their own interests. The evolving relationship between China and Africa represents a shift in global peace and security norms, where Africa's voice and agency are increasingly being heard in shaping its own future. Moving forward, it will be essential for both parties to address the challenges of this partnership, ensuring that future engagements are mutually beneficial, equitable, and sustainable. By strengthening governance structures, promoting transparency, and enhancing local participation in development projects, China and Africa can create a lasting framework for peace and security that benefits both sides.

REFERENCES

- Abdenur, A. E., & Souza Neto, D. M. (2014). South-South cooperation and the role of the rising powers in peacebuilding: Will the BRICS reshape the global security architecture? *Rising Powers Quarterly*, 1(1), 7-18.
- Adesina, J. O. (2020). Development planning and the developmental state in Africa: The Global Financial Crisis and the African Renaissance. *African Sociological Review*, 24(1), 124-146.
- Alden, C. (2007). *China in Africa*. London, United Kingdom: Zed Books, pp. 32-45.

- Besada, H., Wang, Y., & Whalley, J. (2008). China's growing economic activity in Africa. *World Economy*, 31(4), 516-532.
- Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3(2), 77-101.
- Brautigam, D. (2009). *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, pp. 110-145.
- Callahan, W. A. (2016). *China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, pp. 77-112.
- Carmody, P., & Hampwaye, G. (2010). Inclusive or exclusive globalization? Zambia's economy and Asian investment. *Africa Today*, 56(3), 84-102.
- Clapham, C. (1996). *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, pp. 20-45.
- Feng, Z., & Huang, J. (2022). China's Global Security Initiative: Concept, Practice, and Challenges. *Global Policy*, 13(2), 26-34.
- Kuo, J. C. Y. (2022). China's African Security Engagements: Infrastructure, Training, and Non-traditional Security Cooperation. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 57(1), 55-75.
- Large, D. (2008). China and the contradictions of 'non-interference' in Sudan. *Review of African Political Economy*, 35(115), 93-106.
- Lechini, G. (2005). Middle Powers: IBSA and the New South-South Cooperation. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 48(1), 43-58.
- Mawdsley, E. (2008). Fu Manchu versus Dr. Livingstone in the dark continent? Representing China, Africa and the West in British broadsheet newspapers. *Political Geography*, 27(5), 509-529.
- Mlambo, V. H. (2021). Belt and Road Initiative: Political and Security Implications for Africa. *African Security Review*, 30(2), 88-96.
- Rolland, N. (2017). *China's Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative*. Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, pp. 143-155.
- Sidaway, J. D., & Woon, C. Y. (2017). Chinese articulations of 'One Belt, One Road' and spatial imaginaries of globalisation. *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, 107(2), 330-348.
- Sun, Y. (2015). *China's Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 24-44.
- Tan-Mullins, M., Mohan, G., & Power, M. (2010). Redefining 'aid' in the China-Africa context. *Development and Change*, 41(5), 857-881.
- Taylor, I. (2006). *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 75-95.
- Tiezzi, S. (2022). China's Global Security Initiative: What We Know So Far. *The Diplomat*, 8 May 2022, pp. 10-15.
- Xinhua. (2022). Xi Proposes Global Security Initiative. *Xinhua News Agency*, 21 April 2022, pp. 5-8.