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International Dimension of Islamization in Pakistan: A Critical Analysis

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Abstract

This article investigates the international dimensions of Islamization in Pakistan, focusing on the influence of global forces such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United States. Using Globalization and Glocalization theory alongside Braun and Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis, the paper reveals how external ideologies and funding mechanisms penetrated Pakistan's religious infrastructure. By examining the historical evolution of madrasas, foreign alliances during the Afghan Jihad, sectarian dynamics, and regional rivalries, the study highlights the critical role those foreign actors played in shaping Pakistan's religious and political trajectory. The findings underline the need for policy reforms and inter-sectarian harmony to mitigate the long-term socio-political impacts of externally influenced Islamization.

Keywords: Islamization, Globalization, Glocalization, Madrasas, Sectarianism

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INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The phenomenon of Islamization in Pakistan has often been analyzed through domestic political lenses, focusing on internal socio-political and religious movements. However, a critical examination reveals that international factors significantly shaped the trajectory of Islamization in Pakistan, particularly during the Cold War and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. This article examines the international dimension of Islamization in Pakistan, employing globalization and glocalization theories to evaluate how transnational forces contributed to religious transformation. It explores how foreign ideologies, funding, and geopolitical alliances influenced religious education, sectarian politics, and strategic policymaking in Pakistan. In doing so, it uncovers the layers of external influence that reshaped Pakistan's religious and political landscape, with enduring implications for society and statecraft.

Theoretical Framework: Globalization and Postcolonialism

Globalization theory explores the increasing interconnectedness of societies through cultural, economic, and political flows. Appadurai (1996) argues that ideoscapes flows of ideologies and political values shape national identities and belief systems. In the context of Pakistan, religious ideologies, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Iran, traversed national boundaries, deeply influencing domestic religious interpretations and practices. Glocalization, a sub-theory within globalization studies, helps to explain how global religious influences are localized, adapted, and repurposed in the Pakistani context (Robertson, 1995). This dual lens enables an understanding of how global Wahhabi or Shia ideologies were filtered through local sectarian, cultural, and political dynamics.

Postcolonialism offers a complementary framework, highlighting how colonial legacies and Western interventions shaped Pakistan's religious and political evolution. Pakistan, born out of colonial partition, inherited colonial governance structures and remained entangled in Western strategic calculations. Islamization, in many ways, became both a resistance to Western secularism and a tool employed by global powers to pursue geopolitical interests, as seen during the Cold War and the War on Terror (Kumar, 2012; Mamdani, 2004).

These frameworks help us understand that Islamization in Pakistan was neither purely indigenous nor unidirectional. It was, instead, shaped by complex global-local interactions involving religious, political, and strategic dimensions. The concepts of hybridity and ideological circulation help capture the nuanced transformations that occurred within Pakistani society.

Methodology: Braun and Clarke's Thematic Analysis

This qualitative study applies Braun and Clarke's (2006) six-step model of thematic analysis to interpret the international dimension of Islamization. This method provides a structured process for identifying, analyzing, and reporting themes within qualitative data. The six stages of their framework are:

Table 1: Thematic Analysis Framework (Braun & Clarke, 2006)

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S. No	Step	Description	Application
01	Familiarization	Reading key texts, reports, speeches, articles	Historical documents, U.S./Saudi/Iranian relations
02	Generating Codes	Identifying important data features	Codes like Wahhabism, Shia revival, funding links
03	Searching Themes	Grouping codes into overarching categories	Themes like Strategic Patronage, Sectarian Export
04	Reviewing Themes	Validating the internal logic of themes	Cross-analysis across time periods and actors
05	Defining Themes	Naming and contextualizing	Explaining Saudi–Iran rivalry in sectarian terms
06	Producing Report	Synthesizing findings	Linking Islamization to global and regional shifts

Establishment of Madrasas in Pakistan

The institutionalization of religious education in Pakistan began shortly after independence in 1947. While Islamic education had existed for centuries in the form of traditional seminaries, it was during the 1970s and 1980s that madrasas gained unprecedented political and ideological importance. General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization project facilitated their expansion through state patronage, legal reforms, and curriculum development. International support especially from Saudi Arabia significantly accelerated this trend. Wahhabi-influenced seminaries proliferated across Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, often aligned with Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith schools.

Islamization has a direct influence on religious institutions like madrassas in Pakistan. Due to regime survival politics, Islamization has become almost synonymous with Pakistan. Islamization and madrassa education are related and mutually supportive. Because religion is central to Pakistani culture and identity, the educational system needs to preserve and celebrate religious traditions, which is a kind of mindset that exists in Pakistan. The expansion of madrassas in Pakistan can be attributed, in part, to Islamization. Additionally, as a distinct institution, madrassas contributed to the spread of Islam through its teachings and adherents (Bhattacharya, 2014).

Bhattacharya (2014) evaluated that the Madrassas have always been closely tied to the state's patronage, policies, and activities. Madrasas were central in the early Islamic period, both as advocates for Islam and as tools for the state's administrative apparatus. Consequently, madrassas and the state have a shared history of continuity, even in the Indian Sub-continent. In Pakistan, people with low incomes in urban and rural areas strongly feel an affinity for the madrassa. It has taken on more of a political and power-centre role as radical Islam has expanded into the rural areas of the country. As a result, donations and funding were allocated more towards the development of madrasas for political purposes (Butt, 2012).

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The world community has found both cause and effect in the relationship between madrassas and the state, which has led to the demonization of Islam. Due to their contentious and polarizing nature, madrasas in Pakistan have provided an opportunity for the global community to stigmatize Islam and the madrasas and to utilize them for their vested interests. The fact that madrasa education fosters anti-Western, sectarian, and religious intolerance is undeniable (Ahmed Z. S., 2003) . From the perspective of the global community, it is unacceptable that prejudices like these inspire acts of militancy and other types of violence.

There has been controversy about whether or not Pakistan's madrassas foster extremism; however, this is a complicated matter that requires solicitous analysis. Pakistan also considered the issue as a local response to international developments. The Government of Pakistan interpreted the issue as believing that neither militancy nor terrorism was encouraged or promoted in the Madrasa's curriculum. The radicalism observed in certain *madrassas* in Pakistan today was a response to an outside influence that certain political actors, both domestic and foreign, have introduced into these Madrassas to use their religious capital and human resources for their gain (Bell, 2007) . The Pakistani government has acknowledged that there is an issue with the madrassas. The different waves of Islamization have brought multiple phenomena of political Islam in Pakistan as an international agenda. The first two waves of Islamization have fed into the third wave. In a subtle allusion to the Cold War era, the United States, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are mentioned as the international entities that used the madrassas for their own political and religious purposes. Between 1979 and 1989, the number of madrasas in Pakistan increased dramatically from fewer than 900 to more than 8,000 (Fair, 2008). This expansion was largely due to external financial aid and political motivation tied to the Afghan Jihad. Many of these institutions were involved not only in religious instruction but also in recruitment for jihadist networks fighting against the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan. These seminaries fostered ideologies that transcended national boundaries, helping to globalize jihadist discourse and entrench conservative religious norms within Pakistan’s political landscape.

Categorization of Madrasas in Pakistan

The madrassas can be categorized into three schools of thought. One of the key causes of the crisis, according to the first group, is Saudi Arabia's support of Islamic fundamentalism. By supporting these institutions, they encouraged sectarian ideology. Nasr Vali analyzed that Saudi Arabia has funded extremist Islamic groups and the spread of these groups' teachings in mosques, schools, and other public places through the spread of Wahhabi extremism. It has established a foundation for more extremism in the Muslim world. He further added that there was no other state that was funded to promote conservatism and fanaticism among Muslims as Saudi Arabia did (Bell, 2007).

Madrasas in Pakistan may be broadly categorized into five ideological streams:

1. **Deobandi**, which are often linked with Saudi-funded Wahhabi influences, dominant in KP and southern Punjab.
2. **Barelvi** which are often Sufi-influenced, mostly indigenous and historically less politicized.

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3. **Ahl-e-Hadith** are Salafi-oriented, also strongly supported by Gulf donors.
4. **Shi'a** aligned with Iranian theological centers, especially Qom.
5. **Jama'at-e-Islami-affiliated** modernized, politically active, and pan-Islamist in outlook.

These streams signify not only religious diversity but also transnational loyalties. For instance, Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith madrasas often maintain ideological and financial ties with Saudi donors, while Shi'a seminaries receive guidance and support from Iranian clerical institutions. The internationalization of madrasas thus not only deepened sectarian identities but also introduced foreign agendas into Pakistan's religious and political spheres.

Afghanistan Jihad, Zia' s Strategic Alliance, and U.S. – Saudi Influence

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked a critical juncture for regional politics, religious radicalization, and Pakistan's role as a frontline state. The ensuing Afghan Jihad (1979–1989) led to the convergence of Pakistani, American, and Saudi strategic interests, creating a fertile ground for the militarization of Islam and the use of religious education as a geopolitical tool. During this period, madrasas became not only centers of religious instruction but also ideological training grounds for militants.

The militant and jihadi nature of Madrassas is highlighted by Coulson (2004). However, conceded that it is unknown what proportion of Madrassas teach jihadi ideology. There is no consensus on the exact numbers of madrassas teaching Jihadi's ideology and literature. There was an estimated ten to twenty per cent of Pakistan's Madrassas that adhered to extremist ideology. The madrassas were the source of "ideologically sympathetic recruitment" for politically militant individuals and organizations. Militancy and violence have been practiced by around 10-20 % of Madrassas. Most of these schools, according to Goldberg (2001), were based on radical Islam. There were often 25 or 50 students enrolled in madrassas that were located in rural areas. The religious factions in Pakistan funded some of the madrassas, while others had ties to the mujahedeen fighting for independence from India in the contested Kashmir region. A more radical interpretation of Islam was often taught in these schools. It was combining elements of Wahhabism, a strict school of Islam with its roots in Saudi Arabia, and Deobandism, an anti-Western school of thought with its roots in the Indian subcontinent. They hold that modern Islamic states' corrupt leadership is the product of Western influence and that, as a result, Islamic law has not been implemented in Pakistan. According to Haqqani (2002), students at militant madrassas learn to justify violence against everyone who disagrees with their interpretation of Islam. However, some madrassas adopted contemporary textbooks to teach subjects like mathematics, the Urdu language, and other modern disciplines (Coulson A. , 2004).

Thousands of Afghan refugees and Pakistani youth were enrolled in madrasas where a militant interpretation of Islam was taught. Curricula were modified to include jihadist narratives, often with foreign funding. For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the University of Nebraska helped develop schoolbooks that encouraged armed struggle against Soviet forces

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(Kristof, 2002). The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), acting as a conduit for U.S. and Saudi funds, distributed resources to religious groups willing to support the jihad.

This alignment transformed madrasas into ideological incubators for regional militancy. Between 1979 and 1989, the number of madrasas in Pakistan expanded dramatically from under 1,000 to over 8,000 (Fair, 2008). These institutions fostered an ideology that was not merely religious but deeply political, promoting a worldview in which Islam and armed resistance were intrinsically linked. The effects of this transformation have reverberated across decades, feeding into regional instability and sectarian polarization.

Zia’ s Strategic Alliance: Shaping the Afghan War (1979 – 1989)

General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime played a pivotal role in integrating Islamization into Pakistan’s foreign policy during the Cold War. Domestically, Zia utilized religion to consolidate political legitimacy and suppress democratic opposition. Internationally, his alignment with the United States against the Soviet Union granted him unprecedented access to military aid, economic assistance, and diplomatic leverage.

During Zia’s reign, a new phenomenon arose of highly harmful and long-lasting use of religion for political goals where Pakistan was involved as a frontline state in Afghan Jihad and Mujahedeen were created. A major goal was to force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. Under this revised narrative, Islam evolved as a weapon in the worldwide imperial struggle for control of Central Asian oil and gas reserves. Islam allied itself with Western capitalism, which made its imperial ambitions known through the US engagement in Afghanistan, as a result of the dramatic shift in global trends. The United States used Zia to invoke Islam and thwart the Soviet Union's warm water port ambitions in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Saigol, 2010) . The Reagan Administration encouraged and funded the rapid ascent of fundamentalist and sectarian groups during the Zia dictatorship. Over time, the adherents of these parties developed a combative attitude. Each of these groups contested the definition of the Islamic state, fighting for the legitimacy of their interpretation of Islam. Zia’s Islamization turned into sectarian strife with the dominant view of the Deobandi brand of Jammat-i-Islami. Religious political parties were mandated by the state notwithstanding their inability to garner a significant portion of the vote in any election. (Rashid, 1997).

Under Zia, Islamization and foreign policy became intertwined. The strategic partnership with the United States brought over $3.2 billion in economic and military aid between 1981 and 1987 (Cohen, 2004). This alliance was justified as a religious and ideological crusade against atheistic communism. Zia’s speeches emphasized jihad not only as a religious duty but as a national obligation, blending state ideology with militant Islamism.

Saudi Arabia, too, saw an opportunity to expand its influence by financing Wahhabi-oriented institutions in Pakistan. Zia’s introduction of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (1980), the Hudood Ordinances (1979), and his public alignment with Wahhabi jurisprudence were not merely domestic

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religious policies—they also served to attract Saudi patronage. Wahhabi doctrines began to replace indigenous Sunni practices, particularly among the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith sects. In turn, Iran reacted by supporting Shi'a organizations and seminaries within Pakistan, triggering a sectarian cold war on Pakistani soil (Nasr, 2006). Thus, Zia's strategic choices institutionalized the link between foreign funds, ideological reform, and the militarization of religion. The result was a radical restructuring of Pakistan's religious and political landscape.

U.S. Influence on Cold War Islamism and the Islamization of Pakistan

Pakistan's foreign policy has been driven by its geopolitical and ideological concerns. Being at the crossroads of South Asia and the Middle East and being relatively near to the Soviet Union provided it a major geopolitical position. Pakistan has emerged as a potential bridge between the West, East Asia, and the oil-rich Persian Gulf (Sunawar & Tatiana, 2015) . The U.S. has influenced Pakistan's foreign policy throughout history. Pakistan was considered the United States' first real-world front-line ally during the Cold War. However, Pakistan-US relations have been called broken promises, a tale of exaggerated expectations and disastrous misunderstanding (Husain Haqqani, 2013) . This love-hate connection has endeavoured to establish cordial relationships despite the mistrust and fraction. Haqqani (2013) indicated that the United States' goals in pursuing an alliance with Pakistan and Islamabad's goals in accepting it have been somewhat different. But both states were making alliances in line with their own rational choices.

While the U.S. ostensibly supported Pakistan to resist Soviet expansionism, its policies during the 1980s indirectly promoted the Islamization of the Pakistani state. The U.S. government, particularly through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), channeled resources to mujahideen groups that held hardline Islamist views. These groups received funding, training, and ideological endorsement via Pakistan's ISI, which selectively distributed aid to pro-Deobandi and pro-Wahhabi actors (Rashid, 2002).

At the same time, the United States tolerated General Zia's internal repression, sectarian policies, and religiously charged legal reforms. American silence on human rights violations and its focus on geopolitical expediency allowed Zia to promote a theocratic state narrative with little external resistance. The American rhetoric of promoting democracy stood in stark contrast to its support for an autocratic, Islamizing military regime.

Moreover, the U.S. helped create an "Islamic foreign policy" narrative for Pakistan. Propaganda campaigns during the Afghan war portrayed Islam as a global unifying force against communism. This conflation of Islam with state ideology redefined the Pakistani state as a bastion of Islamic resistance, providing fertile ground for militant ideologies to take root. As Haqqani (2005) argues, the U.S.-Zia alliance helped create a parallel military-religious structure that has outlived the Cold War itself.

Saudi Arabia and the Global Spread of Wahhabism

Saudi Arabia's global project to spread Wahhabism aligned closely with its strategic interests in South Asia. During and after the Afghan Jihad, Saudi Arabia provided an estimated $4 billion in aid to Pakistan, much of which was funneled into madrasas, mosques, publishing houses, and clerical exchanges (Rashid,

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2002; Kepel, 2002). This ideological exportation sought to counter both secular nationalism and Iranian Shi'a expansionism, positioning Wahhabism as the true Islamic identity.

Saudi-supported organizations like the Al-Haramain Foundation and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth sponsored the establishment of thousands of new seminaries, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Clerics were trained in Riyadh and Medina and returned to Pakistan with Wahhabi credentials. Curricula in these seminaries emphasized Takfirism (declaring others apostates), jihad, and strict gender segregation.

Petrov-Yoo (2019) and Shah.S(2013), observed Saudi Arabia and Iran as stable US allies in the region. However, the Iranian revolution in 1979 suddenly changed the scenario. CIA acknowledged the dissolution of Saudi-Iranian hegemony following the deposition of the Shah of Iran and his subsequent replacement with Ayatollah Khomeini. The US's influence in the region has decreased as a result of this political evolution. Through aid, the Carter administration solidified the new players in the region, such as Zia, Saudis, and Mujahideen. A formal agreement to collaborate "to develop Pakistan militarily and economically" with US aid was formalized in the early 1980s between the US and Saudi governments. The US was pursuing this development in the context of Cold War to achieve the goals and to restrict Soviet influence.

Saudi influence also extended into higher education. The International Islamic University in Islamabad, established in 1980, became a key Saudi-funded institution for promoting Wahhabi scholarship. Additionally, television and radio content began to reflect Saudi-style Islamic norms, marginalizing local Sufi traditions and promoting a more austere form of Islam.

Saudi Arabia promoted Wahhabism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the world. William Dalrymple (2005), stated that Saudi Arabia stepped up funding of madrassas in Africa and Tanzania with the spending of $ 1 million a year for the building of new madrassas, whereas in Mali, about a quarter of primary school-aged children attend madrassas. Dalrymple (2005) further said that Lee Wolosky, Co-Director of the Independent Task Force on Terrorism Financing, also agreed that Saudi Arabia has funded the proliferation of Wahabisiam in the world. He made the claim in a recent Senate debate that Islamist political groups in Pakistan, like Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), which is associated with the Taliban, as well as Pakistani expats and other foreign entities, many of whom are based in Saudi Arabia, fund and run a significant number of these madrassas (Wolosky, 2004). Saudi Arabia appears to have been the external funder of the expansion of Madrassas and Islamization in all of these cases (Kepel, 2006).

This ideological transformation, backed by petro-dollars, created lasting divisions within Pakistani society. Sufi practices and syncretic traditions gave way to doctrinaire literalism. The erosion of pluralism was accompanied by a spike in sectarian violence and intolerance—phenomena that continue to plague Pakistan to this day.

Iran's Role, Sectarian Dynamics, and the Globalized Landscape of Islamization

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The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran transformed the global Islamic discourse and significantly influenced religious dynamics in Pakistan. Iran's newly formed Shi'a theocracy actively promoted the idea of exporting its revolutionary model. Pakistan, with a substantial Shi'a minority population, became a key theater for Iran's ideological outreach. Tehran funded seminaries, dispatched religious scholars, and supported organizations like Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) to promote the concept of *Wilayat-e-Faqih* (Guardianship of the Jurist) (Nasr, 2006).

This ideological expansion coincided with Zia-ul-Haq's Sunni-oriented Islamization policies, which favored Wahhabi and Deobandi groups. The resulting sectarian imbalance led to mobilization among Pakistani Shi'as, who demanded exemptions from Sunni religious ordinances such as the mandatory zakat deduction. These demands, and the increasing visibility of Shi'a organizations, provoked backlash from Sunni militant outfits, triggering a cycle of violence and sectarian confrontation that shaped Pakistani society through the 1980s and 1990s.

Iranian Islamic Revolution and Its Impact on Pak-Iran Relations

Prior to 1979, Iran and Pakistan shared close strategic ties under U.S.-led regional alliances such as CENTO. However, the revolution replaced Iran's pro-Western monarchy with an anti-imperialist clerical regime. Though ideological divergence became apparent, the geopolitical realities of the region necessitated continued bilateral relations. Iran offered Pakistan discounted oil and engaged in cultural diplomacy, especially among Shi'a constituencies (Rizvi, 2004).

Yet, Iran's support for Shi'a movements in Pakistan, especially TJP and Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP), alarmed both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan's military establishment. Consequently, Iran's involvement was viewed with suspicion, particularly as sectarian violence escalated. Iranian consulates and cultural centers were accused of ideological subversion, while Iran condemned Saudi funding of Sunni extremists. This strategic discomfort became more pronounced during the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, a Sunni group backed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia but opposed by Iran.

Saudi-Iran Rivalry and Its Impacts on Pakistan

The Saudi-Iran rivalry has been instrumental in shaping Pakistan's sectarian landscape. Saudi Arabia's promotion of Wahhabism and Iran's advocacy for revolutionary Shi'ism created two opposing poles of influence, with Pakistan positioned precariously in between. Both states exported their respective ideologies and provided financial and logistical support to religious and political groups aligned with their interests.

Sunni groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and later, anti-Shi'a factions, received extensive funding from Saudi donors. Iran, in response, backed Shi'a militant and advocacy groups, exacerbating sectarian polarization. The contest for ideological supremacy transformed Pakistan into a proxy battleground. Between 1987 and 2015, over 4,000 people died in sectarian attacks (SATP, 2016). This rivalry undermined Pakistan's internal cohesion and further radicalized its religious discourse. Friday sermons, school textbooks, and religious rallies became sites for ideological warfare.

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The competition also spilled into politics, with sectarian groups forming electoral alliances and exerting pressure on legislative bodies, thus blurring the line between religious activism and political militancy.

Terrorism, Sectarianism, and the Globalized Islamization of Pakistan

The post-9/11 global context further complicated the already volatile religious landscape in Pakistan. The international War on Terror revealed the extent to which foreign-sponsored Islamization had embedded extremism within the country's institutions. Groups such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al-Qaeda affiliates, and sectarian militias thrived on the ideologies cultivated during the Afghan Jihad and subsequently reinforced through foreign funding.

These groups targeted not only religious minorities but also state institutions, educational centers, and security forces. The ideological infrastructure that facilitated such violence was sustained by decades of glocalized Islamization—where global ideas were localized by madrasa networks, clerical alliances, and political patronage (Roy, 2004). The curriculum of many seminaries remained unchanged, continuing to promote intolerance and sectarian supremacy.

Blasphemy laws, first introduced by Zia and later strengthened under political pressure, were frequently weaponized against minorities and dissenters. Despite state attempts to regulate seminaries, meaningful reform remained elusive due to the entrenched influence of religious lobbies and continued foreign patronage.

Conclusion

The international dimension of Islamization in Pakistan has evolved through the interaction of global ideologies, regional rivalries, and domestic agendas. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United States each played significant roles in shaping Pakistan's religious and political trajectory through funding, ideological export, and strategic collaboration. The rise of madrasas, militancy, and sectarianism cannot be fully understood without accounting for this foreign influence.

The Cold War's geopolitics, the Saudi-Iran rivalry, and the post-9/11 global order all contributed to the radicalization of Pakistani society. The use of Islam as both a tool of resistance and state policy has deeply politicized religion and weakened pluralistic traditions. While globalization enabled the transnational flow of religious ideologies, glocalization allowed these ideologies to be embedded in local contexts, resulting in a hybridized yet volatile religious culture.

Recognizing the international roots of Pakistan's Islamization is essential for scholars, policymakers, and civil society actors. It is not merely a domestic issue but a global concern with implications for regional stability, international security, and the future of religious tolerance in the Muslim world. Any sustainable strategy for counter-radicalization must engage both internal reform and external diplomacy to dismantle the ideological pipelines that sustain extremism.

The thematic analysis based on Braun and Clarke's (2006) method revealed several key themes: transnational religious influence, sectarian polarization, geopolitical patronage, and the instrumental use of religion for strategic ends. Each theme underscores the entanglement of international and domestic forces in shaping Islamization as a multifaceted and evolving process.

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In conclusion, the international dimension of Islamization in Pakistan cannot be understood in isolation from broader global trends and power dynamics. The impact of foreign funding, ideological exports, and regional rivalries continues to shape the contours of Pakistani society and politics. For policymakers, scholars, and civil society, recognizing this external dimension is crucial in developing strategies for deradicalization, sectarian harmony, and democratic resilience in Pakistan.

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