FEDERALISM AT CROSSROADS IN PAKISTAN: STUDY OF STRUCTURAL DEVOLUTION UNDER THE 18TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Abstract

The disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 suggested that federalism might not suit to the administrative requirements of the country owing to horizontal and vertical cleavages persistent in the length and breadth of the residual state. The musical chairs played by the succeeding democratic governments of 1980s and 1990s further strengthened this image hence the devolution of power envisaged by Pervaiz Musharraf and the later incorporation of 18th Amendment into the Constitution of Pakistan by the democratic government in an attempt to infuse the true spirit of a decentralized federation into a highly polarized polity of the country somewhat pacified the unrest and centrifugal tendencies and elements active in rather underdeveloped and marginalized regions felt accommodated albeit slightly. Accordingly, the instant study explores that how 18th amendment tried to mitigate the differences between the federation and the constituting units through abolishing the concurrent list and granting more financial autonomy to the provinces. It finds that although some meaningful and effective steps have been taken while empowering the bodies like National Finance Commission, National Economic Commission and the Council of Common Interests along with the Inter Provincial Coordination but still a long way ahead for the decision makers and ruling elite in Pakistan to truly achieve the much-aspired provincial autonomy and securing an independently functioning parliamentary democracy.  

Keywords: Federalism in Pakistan, 18th Constitutional Amendment, Inter-Provincial Coordination