DRONES, DETERRENCE, AND STRATEGIC AUTONOMY: UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN MIDDLE-POWER MILITARY STRATEGY

Abstract

This article examines how unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have become central instruments of military strategy for middle powers seeking to strengthen deterrence, project force, and pursue greater strategic autonomy. Drawing on deterrence theory, military innovation theory, and middle-power theory, and employing a qualitative comparative case-study methodology, the article analyses the drone programmes of Turkey, Israel, Iran, and India/Pakistan as analytically distinct yet interconnected cases. It argues that, for middle powers constrained by limited defence budgets, alliance dependencies, and asymmetric exposure to great-power competition, drones do not merely supplement conventional military capability—they reconstitute the very logic of deterrence and strategic positioning. By enabling precision strike, persistent surveillance, force multiplication, and credible deterrence signalling at relatively low cost, unmanned systems allow middle powers to compress the technological advantage of great powers, manage escalation thresholds, reduce alliance dependency, and expand regional influence. The article makes an original theoretical contribution by proposing the concept of 'asymmetric deterrence through unmanned capability' (ADUC) as a framework for understanding how militarily intermediate states leverage drone technology to achieve strategic effects disproportionate to their overall power position. The findings carry important implications for arms control, crisis stability, and the evolving character of regional security competition.

Keywords: drones; unmanned aerial systems; middle powers; deterrence; strategic autonomy; asymmetric warfare;